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The debate about the relation between
psychiatric disorder and neural defect has
produced different argumentative strate-
gies for and against the identification
of these two phenomena. I’ll coin these
strategies as (a) an ontological strategy, (b)
an extensional strategy, and (c) an inten-
sional strategy, on which I will focus in this
article.
The first, ontological strategy takes the
long road over a detailed characteriza-
tion of the nature of psychiatric disorders
and of neural defects. It then goes on to
argue for a relation between these two
ontological kinds. One anti-reductionist
proposition of an ontological strategy can
be found in Stier (2013). He provides a
sketch of a theory of the nature of psychi-
atric diseases, claiming inter alia that psy-
chiatric diseases are social constructions
and intrinsically normative. He goes on to
infer a non-reducibility thesis from these
more or less ontological characterizations:
“if the boundary between normality and
mental disorder is a social construction
such that the question of whether a cer-
tain kind of behavior is a disorder can only
be judged against the background of this
very convention, then the “disorderness”
of a condition cannot be found on—and
hence not be reduced to—the neuronal
level” (Stier, 2013, p. 3).While Stier’s argu-
ment fluctuates between an epistemic and
ontological non-reducibility thesis, I take
him to be talking about the nature of psy-
chiatric diseases and thus about an onto-
logical issue foremost.
The second, extensional strategy inves-
tigates the phenomena that fall into both
categories in order to relate the cate-
gories. In principle one would have to
identify all psychiatric diseases and their
pathways in the brain. If one could iden-
tify at least one neural causal pathway
for each psychiatric disease, all psychiatric
diseases could be assumed to be brain
diseases. Alternatively one could use a fal-
sificatory strategy and look for one psy-
chiatric disease, which does not have a
neural causal pathway. Obviously both are
only in principle and not practically viable
options. Universally quantified statements
and claims of non-existence are well-
nigh impossible to prove. Typically, the
extensional method is applied in exem-
plary research projects. Proponents of the
identity or reducibility of psychiatric dis-
ease to neural phenomena try to show
that a certain psychiatric disease can be
explained with reference to neural phe-
nomena. Opponents of reducibility try to
identify psychiatric diseases for which an
explanation via some neural, causal path-
way is improbable. The extensional strat-
egy has to combat severe methodological
challenges as discussed by Kapur et al.
(2012) cf. the discussion in Walter (2013):
the power of neuro-psychiatric studies, the
limited replication of studies, the reliance
on extreme comparisons and of course, as
Walter (2013) mentions, the ethical issues
of research on the living brain.
The third, intensional strategy takes a
slightly shorter road to elucidating the
relation between psychiatric disorders and
neural defects by discussing their explana-
tory roles: looking at the way the categories
are defined and applied.
Turning to intensional methods
requires some restriction in the use of the
categories and concepts in question. Thus,
instead of talking loosely about mental,
psychiatric or psychological diseases or ill-
nesses and physical, neural or brain based
diseases or states the focus will be on psy-
chiatric disorders and neural defects. The
term “psychiatric disorder” will be used
for two reasons: (1) “disorder” is the term
used in the ICD 10 and in DSM IV and
V; (2) I do not want to talk about the
alleged mental/physical divide, but about
the categorizations of the relevant scien-
tific disciplines, in this case psychiatry;
thus I do not use “mental disorder.” The
term “neural defect” will be used for two
similar reasons: (1) “defect” seems to be
the weakest functional term (more on
functional terms in a moment). (2) I use
the word “neural” instead of “neuroscien-
tific” because I want to refer to the broader
category of defects detected by neuro-
sciences as a whole, not just in single cell
analyses (neuronal) or brain anatomy.
The contrast between the intensional
strategy and the ontological and exten-
sional strategies can be observed in
Schramme (2013). While he does provide
some details on the ontological positions
in the debate of the mind-body prob-
lem in a quite extensive part of his arti-
cle, his persuasive key arguments pertain
to the explanatory roles of mental phe-
nomena, especially psychiatric disorders,
and require only a brief part of the text.
Schrammes two convincing arguments for
an irreducibility of psychiatric disorders to
neural defects are (1) even membership in
a neurological category will not explain,
why the mental states realized by certain
neural states are pathological. The ascrip-
tion of pathology or of being disordered
is dependent on the psychological level of
explanation. (2) In an aside he observes
that neurophysiological explanation does
not even seek explanations of single event
tokens.
According to Schramme’s first argu-
ment, the identification of a neurological
class of states all of which realize some
psychiatric disorder would not suffice to
explain the psychiatric disorder in ques-
tion (Schramme, 2013, 5 f.). This argu-
ment can be further supported by some
details on how the concepts in question are
embedded in their explanatory projects.
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“Psychiatric disorder” and “neural
defect” are concepts from quite differ-
ent disciplinary contexts, which slowly
coalesce: “psychiatric disorder” is first and
foremost a concept of a “-iatric” disci-
pline, namely psychiatry. “Neural defect”
is mainly a concept of neuroanatomy and
-physiology. Both are functional concepts
that serve a disciplinary purpose and have
been shaped in order to do so. A concept
is a functional concept by virtue of its
embeddedness in functional explanation.
The functional explanatory strat-
egy consists in decomposing a specific
explanandum into a set of distinct parts
and trying to show how the parts and
their forces account for the original phe-
nomenon: “[. . . ] the analytical strategy
proceeds by analyzing a disposition d of
a into a number of other dispositions
d1 . . . dn had by a or components of a such
that programmed manifestations of the di
results in or amounts to a manifestation of
d” (Cummins, 1975, p. 759).
The process of decomposition will be
iterated during a functional explanation of
complex systems, especially in explaining
the behavior of an organism. The crucial
question at each onset of decomposition
is what to pick out as the phenomenon to
explain. This decision recurs in every iter-
ation of the decomposition procedure. In a
decomposition of arm movement one has
to decide whether to analyze the behav-
ior of the muscles or that of the tendons
or bones. On the next deeper level one
chooses whether to analyze the behav-
ior of cells or that of extracellular trans-
port systems etc. Thus, just as the specific
explanandum depends on the background
theory, the explanatory path in functional
explanation depends on the decomposi-
tional decisions.
Two distinct sub-types of this method
give rise to the concepts of a psychiatric
disorder and of a neural defect. Their dif-
ferences are threefold:
(1) Context of detection. Psychiatric
disorders strike the observer as some-
thing to be explained and treated:
Usually psychiatric disorders are
abnormalities of behavioral patterns
observed in terms of folk and scientific
psychology. Either they themselves
are the reason for an analysis of the
behavioral pattern or the pattern has
been the target of prior interest in
psychology or cognitive science.
Neural defects are further removed
from casual attention: Neural defects
are abnormalities in the working of
causal pathways, in the parts and
forces making up a phenomenon.
They can only be found after an
analysis. The abnormalities in these
pathways can but need not result in
abnormalities in behavior.
(2) Context of action. The analysis of
psychiatric disorders is driven by
the desire to understand a behav-
ioral abnormality and if possible to
find a therapy or workaround. Neural
defects in contrast are found in anal-
ysis driven by a purely explanatory
research interest.
(3) Last but not least, the context of
explanation. Neural defects turn up
when physiological phenomena are
analyzed into physiological parts and
their tempo-spatial relations. A neu-
ral defect primarily is defined within
a mechanistic explanation of some
neural phenomenon (Bechtel, 2009;
Craver, 2013). Mechanistic expla-
nation typically elucidates relatively
complex behaviors of biological sys-
tems by the actions and interactions
of their constituting subsystems.
The actions and interactions of the
subsystems in turn are explained
by actions and interactions of their
respective subsystems; insofar mech-
anistic explanation is a type of
functional explanation as mentioned
above (Craver, 2013). Mechanistic
explanation is a special type of func-
tional explanation however, because
it strictly sticks to componential anal-
ysis, that is: the subsystems stand in
a physical part-whole relation to the
system, which gets explained. The
main interest in ascribing a function
and noticing a defect is explanatory.
Something is a function because it
contributes to some complex behavior
in most homologs, which a scientist
aims to explain. The word “function”
could be replaced by “normal causal
role.” Something is a defect, because
in the more numerous homologs the
causal pathways work differently. The
word “defect” in this context could be
replaced by “abnormality.”
A similar type of analysis can be found in
cognitive science, with the not so minor
variation that what gets explained are
cognitive abilities and behavior, and they
typically get analyzed into cognitive and
affective sub-tasks and capacities. There
are for example theories of long term
memory, distinguishing it into subtasks of
encoding and consolidation, storage and
retrieval as well as into different subtypes
like episodic, semantic, procedural, and
priming memory. The explaining subsys-
tem and the system, which get explained
do not stand in a physical part-whole-
relation. The decomposition is cybernetic
and not componential.
While neural abnormalities can be con-
sidered defective only relative to explana-
tory interests, it seems to be possible
to identify cognitive or affective defects
beyond such an interest (contra Stier,
2013). If a person can’t grasp objects in her
right visual field, or can’t remember words
for more than a few moments, that seems
to be a defect no matter what. This alleged
obviousness of there being a defect stems
from the close interdependence of cogni-
tive science and psychiatry as regards their
phenomena as well as their methodology.
The psychiatric diagnosis of a defect and
thus the psychiatric ascription of function
and dysfunction is often prior to anal-
ysis in cognitive science. The discussion
how to define functions in psychiatry is
still on-going and vast [for an overview cf.
Schramme (2010)]. None of the sugges-
tions, however, takes recourse to analyzing
complex behaviors into physical parts and
forces as is done in mechanistic expla-
nation. The explanantia of both meth-
ods, psychological and psychiatric, do not
stand in a physical part-whole relation to
the system and behavior explained.
To conclude: Neural defect and psy-
chiatric disorder are defined within
different types of analysis. One is
componential, decomposing complex
phenomena based on purely explana-
tory interests, ascribing function on
the basis of comparison to homologs.
The other is non-componential, decom-
posing complex phenomena based on
interventionist interests, ascribing func-
tions on the basis of systemic goals.
The categories are thus neither identical
nor bear an obvious intensional rela-
tion. As Schramme concludes, there is
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no reason for “discounting any of the
two—neurophysiological or mental—
perspectives. Mental illness is not
reducible to brain illness, even when men-
tal phenomena have their basis in the
brain” (Schramme, 2013).
It is highly implausible that two cat-
egories based on different methods,
research interests etc. are homomorphic,
that is, can be related in a one to one style.
As Schramme (2013, p. 6) points out as
well, it would be more than surprising if
for every taxonomic class of folk psychol-
ogy, or, as I must add, of psychiatry there
were one related type of neural defect or
the other way around. As results in cog-
nitive neuroscience, neuropsychiatry and
related disciplines already show, the rela-
tion between neural defect and psychiatric
disorder is much more complicated: dif-
ferent neural defects can result in the same
disorder, sometimes a psychiatric disorder
is caused by several coincidental neural
defects etc. Thus, even if the metaphysical
thesis, that all mental states are token iden-
tical to physical states is true, and I take it
to be true, that does not help one bit in
explaining or treating any of them.
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